Introduction Umut Özsu
In the autumn of 1922, more than three years after the commencement of the Paris Peace Conference, Fridtjof Nansen left for Istanbul. He went as League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, having had his mandate extended to include Greeks fleeing war in Asia Minor. Once in the city, then under Allied occupation, he wrote to Eleftherios Venizelos, until recently prime minister of Greece and still a leading figure in European diplomatic circles, to propose measures for the resettlement of Greek refugees. Among these proposals was an exchange of minority populations between Greece and Turkey, which Nansen described as being 'within the scope of the mission with which the League of Nations' had entrusted him. ordered the mass expulsion of Greeks, a measure which may have 'fallen into disuse' over the years but which was nevertheless 'lawful on the condition of being exercised humanely'. 15 To be sure, no legally formalized compulsory exchange had ever been undertaken on anything approaching the level envisioned here. But experience had been gained with ostensibly voluntary treaty-based transfers in Anatolia and the Balkans, and resettlement programmes remained ubiquitous, from deportations and land reforms in Russia to the continued expulsion (p.4) of indigenous peoples in Africa, the Americas, and elsewhere. Indeed, as noted by Carl Schmitt-who saw Turkey's 'radical expulsion of the Greeks' as evidence that 'actual democracy' demands the 'eradication of heterogeneity' 16 -manipulation of territories and populations in accordance with principles like cujus regio ejus religio had distinguished the European land order, and the international legal order it threw up, since at least the Reformation. 17 Yet here, in Greece and Turkey, in the very heart of what nineteenth-century jurists and statesmen had termed the 'Eastern Question', international lawyers would be pushed to new limits. In 1906, as president of a 'Balkan Committee' convened by the British Parliament, John Westlake had already been exasperated with the situation: 'extreme misgovernment in Turkey is a nuisance to the neighbouring European States', he had written, adding that 'if the Sultan cannot keep order in his own dominions, or if to keep order he has recourse not to civilised means of repression but to massacre, he loses all claim to be regarded as a ruler to whom international law can apply'. 18 By the time the terms of the Greek-Turkish population exchange were concluded in early 1923, it had become obvious that minority protection, as developed by the Concert of Europe during the nineteenth century and refined in the hands of the Allies after 1919, was not going to be enough to stabilize a region widely regarded as 'perhaps the most important of the world's arenas of imperial friction'. 19 A new batch of protective mechanisms would, admittedly, be introduced for minorities. But something else, a 'more radical remedy' to 'minority problems', 20 was necessary if the region was to have lasting peace and prosperity. It was no less clear, however, that this 'more radical remedy' could not take the form of a top-tobottom reconstitution of whole economies, societies, and legal systems-a reconstitution of the type that had been undertaken in many corners of the colonial world and that also drove much of the League's Mandate System. While politically and economically dependent upon the West, Africa, organizing itself as an Islamic power spearheaded by a sultan-caliph and boasting a multilingual and multi-confessional population. The scope and strength of Ottoman power in Europe began to waver in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when successive wars with Russia led to territorial losses and the emergence of proto-nationalist modes of socioeconomic mobilization. Of particular importance was the successful liberation struggle waged by Greek insurgents during the 1820s and 1830s, resulting in the creation of an independent Greek kingdom. In 1878, following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania were constituted as independent sovereign states, and Bulgaria was extended recognition as a de facto independent state. 21 This transformed political and economic dynamics in the Balkans, feeding rival nationalist programmes, fuelling the growth of opposing bourgeoisies, and encouraging the persecution and forced emigration of groups that now found themselves in the position of minorities. Among Muslims evicted from their homes in the Balkans, the war and its consequences came to be known as the 'unweaving of 93' ('93 sökümü'), the year 1293 corresponding to 1877 in the Ottoman Rumi calendar. 22 The resulting ethnic and religious tensions frequently facilitated competition between European powers, from
Britain and (p.6) France in the west to Russia and Austria-Hungary in the east. Far from being limited to the Balkans, such developments were mirrored, albeit initially with less intensity, in other parts of what had by then come to be known as the 'Near East', particularly Anatolia.
Relations between Greece and the Ottoman Empire were particularly prone to volatility during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Political and commercial elites in the Kingdom of Greece often nursed ambitions of irredentist expansion, espousing the Megali Idea, or 'Great Idea', of detaching Istanbul and territories with significant Greek Orthodox populations from Ottoman rule. For their part, Ottoman authorities tended to be wary of Greek designs, and many retained hopes that the empire might eventually re-establish its hold over European territories it had been forced to abandon. Although stable relations were generally maintained, a series of local skirmishes in Crete led to full-scale war between the two states in 1897, a conflict from which the Ottomans emerged militarily victorious but diplomatically hobbled (Ottoman troops managed to defeat Greek forces in Thessaly and Epirus but were forced to grant autonomy to Crete itself). The 1912-13 Balkan Wars sounded the death knell to all notions of Greek-Ottoman rapprochement. The Ottomans were roundly defeated in the First Balkan War, a conflict that reshaped the map of south-east Europe, but managed to recover some of their losses during the Second Balkan War. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that the Greek-Turkish population exchange was the principal galvanizing force behind the cultivation of a distinct mode of legally formalized nationbuilding in the early twentieth century. 24 As the first legally structured compulsory endeavour of its scale and sophistication, the sheer ambition of the exchange was staggering: over 1 million Greeks (or those identified as such) were uprooted from Asia Minor and eastern Thrace immediately before and during the formal exchange, which began in 1923 and continued for years to come, and something in the vicinity of 350,000 Muslims (or those so classified) were expelled from Greece's mainland and islands over the same stretch of time. The formal exchange concluded at Lausanne in January 1923 followed the expulsion of large numbers of Greeks and others from Asia Minor and eastern Thrace in 1922, particularly after the partial destruction of Izmir, and has therefore sometimes been presented as an endorsement of an already existing reality. This ignores the fact that the formal exchange called for a variety of fresh movements (nearly all 350,000 Muslims and roughly 200,000 of the concerned Greeks). It also misses the crucial point that the formal procedure lent legal legitimacy to a set of movements that redistributed land and capital across enormous swathes of territory, establishing a comprehensive legal regime to manage relief, resettlement, and indemnification efforts. More than two months of tough negotiations were needed before Turkey and the Allied Powers were able to agree on the terms of the exchange, and all parties invested heavily in the talks. This was an exercise both in producing new facts on the ground and in juridifying the dispossession, displacement, and capital accumulation that had already taken place.
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(p.8) The exchange showcased the new pragmatism of the post-First World War international order, an increased willingness on the part of lawyers and politicians alike to adapt legal doctrine to local conditions, bringing greater, more sophisticated institutional resources to bear on crafting functionally suitable solutions to pressing problems. 26 The chief aim here was not to organize plebiscites or install protective mechanisms for under-resourced or under-represented minorities-both important aspects of the Allies' management of imperial disintegration in Europe after 1919. Nor was it to restructure all facets of a given economy and society in order to generate an entirely new legal system; this had often been the case with colonialism in Asia and Africa, and would characterize a good deal of the League's system of mandates. Instead, the aim of the Greek-Turkish exchange was to reshape the demographic composition of the two states in question, aligning ethnos with demos as tightly as possible with the help of a mechanism that was tailored to the region at hand. If Greece and Turkey were to be refashioned by way of a compulsory exchange, a mechanism whose status under international law was imprecise but with which many lawyers were nevertheless willing to work, this was due in no small part to the semi-peripheral character of Greece and Turkey, which both permitted and demanded reliance on a distinct procedure.
In developing this argument, I focus upon Ottoman and post-Ottoman Turkey to a greater degree than Greece, as it was through European engagement with the former that practices and doctrines of minority protection and population transfer (and also humanitarian intervention) were developed with greatest vigour. My argument proceeds in four stages. First, I provide a history of the international law of minority protection. The nation-building project the GreekTurkish exchange facilitated was carried out against the background of a tradition of minority protection fostered by the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe system and furthered by twentieth-century experiences with League-sponsored minority governance. I trace this law's development from its classical origins in the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna, through the balanceof-power treaties concluded during the remainder of the nineteenth century, and finally to the minority-protection mechanisms introduced into a number of newly created or reconfigured states, Turkey included, after the First World War. Nineteenth-century intra-European treaties created minorities where they were not recognized legally, and crafted fresh entitlements for minorities where they already enjoyed formal recognition. Minority treaties backed by the Allied Powers after the Great War were driven by a broadly similar commitment to manage nationalism, but were designed under different conditions and with more in the way of institutional support to reinforce (p.9) their efforts. Post-Ottoman Greece and Turkey posed serious challenges here, in that neither a minority treaty nor a set of minority-protection provisions inserted into a peace treaty were believed to be enough to ensure stability. Ultimately, the minority-protection regime that was introduced into Turkey via the post-war settlement was not only weak (its application was limited to relatively small numbers of remaining non-Muslims and the rights it enshrined were less forceful than was the case elsewhere), but also conditioned upon a compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey. If much of what motivated minority protection, from the early nineteenth to the early twentieth century, was a desire to regulate nationalism on Europe's eastern margins, the exchange was the culmination of this commitment in a context that had come to be deemed too volatile for conventional minority-protection instruments alone.
Second, I offer a discussion of the Greek-Turkish exchange's immediate antecedents. The exchange is sometimes presented as a wholly sui generis development, an utterly anomalous phenomenon with no forerunners. But this is neither accurate from a descriptive standpoint nor adequate from an explanatory one. In truth, the exchange demands extensive contextualization, the specific socio-historical milieu in which it was conceived and executed having roots in a number of earlier experiments in the Balkans and Asia Minor. Forced migrations in the final decades of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth century had increased tensions between the Ottoman Empire's constituent ethno-confessional groups, fuelling bitterness and secessionism within non-Muslim communities and mobilizing ever larger numbers of TurkishMuslim officers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals around the notion of a centralized, ethnically Turkish state. 'Voluntary' transfers were arranged between a variety of Muslim and Christian communities in the Balkans and Asia Minor during the 1910s in order to cope with war-related displacements or facilitate fresh movements with a view to ensuring national and regional 'security'. In the process, these transfers spurred the growth of a distinct body of international 30 I first discuss the humanitarian background to the dispute that generated this opinion, examining the various relief organizations involved in resettlement and reconstruction initiatives immediately prior to and during the course of the formal exchange. Many such organizations boasted strong ties to missionary groups that had been active on Ottoman soil for some time; they employed analogous techniques, drew much of their membership from such groups, and, perhaps most revealingly, were frequently viewed by local actors as motivated by the same type of civilizing mission. From there I move on to the World Court's opinion, analysing the way in which it broached the question of Istanbul's établis, residents of the city exempted from the exchange on account of their status as Greeks. The Court's attempt to draw a sharp distinction between domestic and international law by maximizing the treaty-based rights of Istanbul's Greeks cannot, I argue, be understood without an appreciation of the broader context within which the dispute regarding their status came to the fore, particularly the widely felt desire to protect remaining minority communities by channelling assertions of sovereign right into a multilaterally coordinated programme of nation-and state-formation. As with the humanitarians of the League of Nations (p.11) and organizations like Near East Relief, the World Court sought to ensure that the exchange procedure was managed internationally rather than nationally, supporting a new interstate order formalized by treaty law rather than simply feeding an unruly and violent ethnonationalism.
PRINTED 33 would begin to appear. Still, most interwar jurists were sceptical of its legality.
Robert Redslob, for instance, branded transfer a political, not a legal, solution to the 'problem of nationalities', useful perhaps as a means of fostering 'national unity' but running counter to the kind of minority protection found 'in every peace treaty by virtue of customary law'. 34 Others noted that the population-transfer mechanism departed from established European techniques like the 'right of option'-the right, that is, of people inhabiting territories transferred from one sovereign to another to choose between retaining their existing nationalities (in which case they would be expected to move) and becoming nationals of the new sovereign (in which case they would remain where they were). 35 The 'brutal measure of expulsion and forced emigration' flouted such techniques, they argued, falling foul of the 'basic principles that are the foundation of the public law of civilized nations'. 36 A product mainly of Turkey's desire to liquidate its minorities 'completely and (p.12) radically', 37 the exchange was 'an unfortunate regression in the evolution of the law of nations', 38 holding back its 'diplomatic, doctrinal and jurisprudential' development. 39 Some jurists differed in their assessment, though, and were willing to consider even overtly compulsory exchanges as minimally legal, though not necessarily deserving of moral or political praise. While Lausanne did not comply with prevailing principles of minority protection, one jurist admitted, it did offer an 'entirely different approach' to resolving conflict through law. 40 The 1922-34 Greek-Turkish exchange may have threatened to restore 'the wild and primitive conception of war', wrote another, but it had also been enshrined in 'a solemnly signed and legally ratified treaty'. 41 After all, the same author continued, while it might be the case that 'positive international law, in permitting compulsory exchange, was once again the slave of force', it could not be denied that positive international law did in fact grant such permission. 42 Indeed, no less an authority than the Permanent Court stated that the GreekTurkish exchange was governed by a binding international treaty and that the interpretational dispute with which it was confronted 'involve[d] a question of international law'; the question of the treaty's legality, or even legitimacy, was simply not on the table. 43 Such views often exerted considerable influence over policymakers. British authorities in mandate-era Palestine were so impressed by the Greek-Turkish endeavour that they too would entertain an exchange. Whereas formerly 'the Greek and Turkish minorities had been a constant irritant', the Peel Commission's report declared, 'the ulcer ha[d] been clean cut out', placing relations between the two states on much firmer footing. 44 Statements of the latter variety were hardly groundless. The instrument that regulated the Greek-Turkish exchange procedure was negotiated and drafted in the form of a treaty, deposited with the relevant authorities, registered with the League of Nations, published in its official compendium of treaties, entered into force with the requisite ratifications, and, most 45 Interwar jurists, however, were typically willing to attribute a significant degree of constitutive power to international law. Its rules and principles were not simply second-order reflections of existing states of affairs, but resilient, productive forces in their own right, equipped to recast whole regions if necessary. When backed up by treaty, shuffling whole communities from one place to another, by consent or by coercion, displayed and reinforced this constitutive power. Whether the formal exchange was understood to flout or conform to prevailing international legal norms, that it flowed in large part from a multilateral treaty intended to channel and constrain ethno-nationalism through regionally specific means was widely appreciated.
II. Distinguishing the Problem
That the Greek-Turkish exchange is the locus classicus of a distinct form of legal nation-building has a number of doctrinal and methodological implications. The first such implication stems from my concern with ethno-nationalism, the second pertains to the international law of selfdetermination, and the third relates to the multiple legal sources of Turkey's nation-building project and the regionally specific character of the population-exchange mechanism. In different but broadly analogous ways, all three involve issues arising from Turkey's experience as a former imperial power situated on the margins of Europe-a state with a strained, but uniquely non-colonial, relationship with the international law generated by Europe over the preceding centuries.
To begin with, many scholars of the Ottoman and post-Ottoman Balkans have taken issue with the tendency to associate the region with an exceptionally virulent strain of illiberal, chauvinistic nationalism. It has been argued that ethno-nationalism's popular affiliation with the Balkans is ideologically dubious, and that the conceptual distinction between 'civic' and 'ethnic' nationalism is far from clear, since even the most moderate forms of 'civic' nationalism tend ultimately to be premised upon a measure of racial or linguistic exclusion. 46 Reinforcing such concerns is the fact that nationalism, however understood, was a relative latecomer to the Ottoman Empire, and that, when it finally did arrive (p.14) on the scene, it generally found expression in a complex amalgam of ethnic, territorial, and confessional claims.
While understandable, such misgivings can be exaggerated to such a degree that they undermine the possibility of a form of nationalism that prioritizes ethnicity as the principal modality of socio-economic identification. This book is driven by a concern with the processes through which population transfer arose on Europe's south-eastern fringes as a legal instrument for managing preponderantly ethno-national forms of mobilization. But it makes no claim that What is most distinctive about the population-exchange mechanism, as first developed in the Balkans and Asia Minor during the 1910s and 1920s, is not the fact that it showed up the less savoury features of self-determination. 51 Rather, it is the fact that it marked a departure both from the practice of introducing protective instruments for minorities-common in Europe throughout the long nineteenth century and augmented considerably after 1919-and from the practice of reconstructing entire economies and societies from scratch-the typical case of colonial and neo-colonial administration in Asia and Africa. Legally formalized population transfer was not called forth by the international law (or even political slogan) of selfdetermination so much as the commitment to craft functional solutions to challenging conflicts in a context framed neither as strictly European nor as strictly non-European.
A third and closely related point flows directly from this distinctiveness. Western legal traditions, both municipal and international, had exerted considerable influence over the Ottoman Empire for some time. In some respects, this had been driven by diplomacy, as with France both before and after 1789 (e.g. long-standing alliances reaching back as far as the sixteenth century, the enormous prestige bestowed upon the Code Napoléon in the nineteenth 55 Indeed, the influential classification of 'civilized', 'barbarous', and 'savage' humanity offered by James Lorimer-with Turkey as the archetypal illustration of the 'barbarous' (or 'semi-civilized') state-was intended to convey precisely this precariousness.
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Just as the new social sciences tended to segregate the study of 'savage' populations (the principal sphere of the young discipline of anthropology) from that of non-European 'civilizations' (the core of most orientalist scholarship), 57 so too did the period's international legal scholarship taxonomize the rules and principles to be applied to different states and regions, marked as it was by a desire to fashion a (p.17) workable 'standard' for grading and assessing competing claims to 'civilizational' status.
58
Because of this distinctiveness, this book does not attempt to identify one or two Western 'parents' for Turkey's legal reconstitution through the population exchange, a key element of much post-colonial scholarship. Nor does it try to assimilate the Turkish case to a familiar narrative of nineteenth-and early twentieth-century attempts to craft responses to the European 'problem of nationalities'. Instead, it examines the processes through which shifting relations of power between a variety of actors and institutions facilitated Turkey's transition from empire to nation-state by way of the exchange. 
III. Analysing an International Legal Field
This study marshalls a range of legal as well as historical and sociological material, notably from world-systems theory. 60 However, its methodological parameters (p.18) are defined to an important degree by those streams of post-realist socio-legal theory that are generally associated with the work of Pierre Bourdieu. 61 Following Bourdieu, I approach law neither as a policy tool nor as a formal system but as a 'social space', 62 a distinct arena of action that both defines and is defined by competition between agents wielding different quantities and qualities of social capital. Although law is, of course, capable of being utilized as an instrument, and though it may under certain conditions lend itself to exposition as a system distinguished by internal coherence and immanent rationality, it is best understood as a social field that translates competition between unequally endowed actors into a set of formalized practices, refracting political, economic, and other conflicts through a medium marked at least as much by normative constraint as by struggle for power. 63 As such, I examine international law from a historico-sociological rather than an instrumentalist or philosophical standpoint, analysing its operation in a particular context at a particular juncture with a view to illuminating the emergence and development of a particular mode of nation-building.
The exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey recruited an astonishingly wide range of actors-lawyers, diplomats, bureaucrats, clergymen, philanthropists, military officers, and a variety of other 'brokers of the international'. 64 Some, like Nansen, saw themselves as responding to a pressing crisis, participating in a broader project of reorganization in order to bring stability to a region that had not known it for some time. The West had done precious little to rescue Armenians from genocide, and it could ill afford to stand by and watch as (p.19) Greeks and Turks razed whole provinces in the name of this or that programme of ethnonational 'regeneration'. Others understood the exchange not simply as a means of achieving stability, but as an opportunity to realize particular aspirations they had nursed for years. Most members of the Turkish nationalist elite, for instance, were convinced that it was only through completing the project of ethno-national homogenization initiated by the Young Turks that the foundations of a viable order might be established in post-Ottoman Turkey. Still others threw their weight behind the claim that the exchange was driven by the demands of a world in which technocracy had begun to dominate both the form and content of international relations. The Great War had shown up the limits of cosmopolitanism. If a region as volatile as the Near East were to survive, let alone thrive, in this new order, it would need to be parcelled into discrete, easily manageable units, amenable to greater levels of political and economic control. Regardless of where they stood, though, all such actors operated within a common international legal field. This approach has significant consequences for the account given in this book of the role of states and organizations external to the Near East. The great powers were instrumental in designing and executing the exchange, acting in and through the League of Nations' constituent organs and a variety of humanitarian organizations. The League had implanted minorityprotection regimes throughout central and eastern Europe in an effort to forestall majorityminority conflicts, some of which were long-standing and others of which resulted from new distributions of sovereign authority. Since this was thought to be insufficient in Greece and Turkey, recourse was had to the compulsory exchange, a more radical and coercive measure that many believed 'would have been impossible in Central-Europe'. 65 Equally, this approach has important implications for my account of the crucial role that was played by Turkish nationalists in the exchange. The revolutionary vanguard led by Kemal was committed to the exchange, consenting to it, and the recalibration of Turkish law and society it entailed, in the name of a comprehensive programme of nation-building. Securing the new state's borders, homogenizing its population, and extending Ankara's authority over the length and breadth of the territory it had inherited from its imperial predecessor were, it was assumed, necessarily interrelated, part and parcel of the modernization project to which Kemal and his followers had dedicated themselves. If post-Ottoman Turkey was to bootstrap itself into modernity through defensive (p.20) Because of its magnitude and its overtly coercive character, the Greek-Turkish population exchange has always strained the tolerance and imagination of international lawyers. Although often criticized, proposals for the exchange were not condemned with enough sincerity and consistency to impede its formalization and implementation. Neither, for that matter, did the Greek-Turkish experience, growing out of forces and relations specific to the region, render impossible the extension of the transfer procedure to other jurisdictions in the decades that followed. On the contrary, jurists and diplomats soon pressed ahead with legally formalized transfers in a variety of contexts. The mechanism was employed by Nazi and Soviet policymakers during the interwar years and the Allies immediately after the Second World War, and broadly analogous efforts found expression in the partition of British India in 1947, the exodus of Palestinian Arabs in 1948, the expulsion of ethnic Greeks from northern Cyprus in 1974-5, and the widespread use of forced migration in the former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s-all procedures that were subject to ex ante or ex post juridification. In the process, population transfer came to be regarded as one among a variety of conflict-resolution techniques that circulated as a 'global legal commodity' promising stability and development.
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If we are to understand the popularity of population transfer throughout the twentieth century, and its tacit or express endorsement in some quarters even today, we must come to grips with its origins in a semi-peripheral region with a specific set of entrenched traditions and institutions.
Notes:
( protection they had inherited from their nineteenth-century forerunners, bringing its commitment to govern ethno-nationalism to bear on a context in which it had only limited application; their willingness to work with, and in many cases simply submit to the demands of, local elites determined to realize their own nationalist ambitions-as though in miniature, each of these features found a home in Nansen's mission.
Although it had its roots in Anatolia and the Balkans, legally mediated population transfer and related forms of demographic engineering travelled to other regions before long, experiencing something of a successive 'globalization' in the process. 10 The legal architecture of every such movement (and there were others) was different. Some took the form of unilateral transfers or bilateral exchanges inaugurated by law, while others were uncoordinated movements subject to ex post juridification. In certain cases law organized the movement from the outset; in others it completed a task that (p.123) was already underway. Yet the logic of legally formalized population transfer-and the nation-building techniques with which it was accompanied and which were frequently rolled into broader development agendas 11 -circulated with remarkable consistency. Indeed, in most cases, from Potsdam to Dayton, the Greek-Turkish population exchange was cited as a key precedent. 12 Shortly before his death in 1942, none other than Politis would recognize as much when he suggested that the wartime Nazi-Soviet transfer agreements, and the Reich's policy in regard to population movements more generally, derived in large part from Lausanne. 13 Once considered only in respect to the Near East, a region regarded as falling short of Western standards of 'civilization' and subject to manipulation by imperialist powers, population transfer had now entered into the general lexicon of statecraft, appropriated by the very states that had voiced discomfort at its precedential consequences. 29 It is difficult to imagine circumstances in which whole peoples would submit 'voluntarily' to community-wide displacement. And the tenability of a strict distinction between 'compulsory' and 'voluntary' transfers is complicated by the fact that high levels of persecution and intimidation have typically characterized the latter, making migration effectively 'compulsory' even when it is not explicitly characterized as such. But international law arguably continues to permit reliance upon population transfer when such willingness is (or is deemed to have been) expressed 'freely'.
On a certain level, one can appreciate, if not necessarily acquiesce to, the appeals of population transfer. Those entrusted with the task of administering territories home to significant conflict have frequently looked to population transfer as a necessary evil, the most humanitarian of logistically viable options. Unsurprisingly, as the classic illustration of this mode of conflict resolution, the Greek-Turkish exchange has enjoyed pride of place in most such cases. The Palestine Royal Commission, charged with offering recommendations for the administration of the British mandate over Palestine, lauded 'the courage of the Greek and Turkish statesmen' involved in the exchange, declaring that relations between Greece and Turkey were 'friendlier than they have ever been before' and suggesting that a similar exchange be undertaken as part of Palestine's partition. 30 Likewise, Churchill lavished praise on those responsible for the GreekTurkish exchange when pressed on the merits of the proposed transfer of Germans out of central and eastern Europe: 'disentanglement' had 'in many ways [proven] a success', and had, at any rate, 'produced friendly relations between Greece and Turkey ever since'. 31 There is something to be said for all this. Tensions between Greece and Turkey would remain at a high level through the 1920s, but proved to be manageable during the two decades that followed. In 1930 Venizelos travelled to Ankara to sign a landmark 'friendship' treaty, having already set aside outstanding claims to properties (p.126) lost or abandoned during the exchange. 32 Relations between the two states improved to such a degree that Kemal felt comfortable bringing his long-awaited vision of a 'Balkan Pact' to a head. Intended to cement commitment to uti possidetis through mutual security guarantees, the pact was signed and ratified by four states-Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia-in 1934, the work, it was thought, of a more enlightened understanding of the region's needs and resources. accelerated the emigration of the établis. 40 The Cyprus conflict came to the fore in full force during the same decade. Before long, large segments of the island's Greek-Cypriot population began to agitate for enosis, or union, with Greece; Greek-Cypriot paramilitaries committed to securing this union targeted Turkish civilians and British soldiers alike; Turkish Cypriots reacted by pressing for the island's taksim, or partition, and also by supporting their own paramilitaries; the two communities subsequently struggled for years until a pro-enosis coup in Nicosia and support from an Athenian junta brought the issue to a head in 1974, with Turkey intervening militarily to occupy the northern third of the island. As is well-known, numerous legal disputes have arisen from the mass expulsion of Greeks from Turkish-occupied territory, the ensuing flight of many Turkish Cypriots to the north, the contested status of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' declared unilaterally in 1983, and the difficulties engendered by Cyprus' accession to the European Union in 2004. 41 Equally challenging has been complex legal wrangling regarding maritime and airspace rights in the Aegean Sea. 42 Only rarely have international lawyers in Greece and Turkey sought to challenge such developments. More often than not they have simply affirmed the validity of official policy, a tendency encapsulated perhaps most crudely in Yılmaz Altuğ's statement that '[t] he minority is subordinate to the sovereignty of the state and it must respect the juridical order on which its rights depend'. 43 Examined in the light of these later developments, the Greek-Turkish exchange seems considerably less 'successful' than has often been assumed. The exchange may have smoothed inter-state relations in the Near East to some degree. If nothing else, it cannot be denied that Greece and Turkey were now possessed of a much greater degree of ethno-religious homogeneity, and that this was more than likely an important factor in minimizing the risk of a recurrence of war. But it would clearly be reckless to risk stronger, more sweeping conclusions regarding the normative value, or even functional viability, of population transfer. As though the chequered history of Greek-Turkish relations during the remainder of the twentieth century were not enough to discredit such conclusions, the fact that much of the scholarship relating to the exchange has been dominated by misleading representations of the historical record, and that this continues to be the case despite efforts by critical historians, 44 resilience of entrenched rivalries. Indeed, it is arguable that while ameliorative of conflict in the short term, the Greek-Turkish exchange actually exacerbated such rivalry over the medium-to long-term: in the place of two states with 'mixed' populations and institutions equipped to regulate such heterogeneity, there were now two nation-states forged through conflict and expulsion, each with a citizenry that much more conscious and resentful of the other.
Given the need for scepticism in respect to the Greek-Turkish precedent, the popularity of population transfer and roughly analogous forms of mass expulsion seems stranger still. From a comparatively marginal response to conflict, thought to be legal but limited in application to a specific region, to a more or less 'universal' mechanism, deemed applicable to all manner of contexts even as its legality came under question, the international legal history of population transfer is a tale both of growing fascination and of growing opprobrium. After 1945 leading jurists and policymakers often regarded transfer as a legitimate competitor to group rights and individualistic human rights. Raphael Lemkin, lawyer and celebrated advocate of the Genocide Convention, may, for instance, have clung steadfast to minority protection, but the influential activist and demographer Joseph Schechtman considered transfer to be the only truly viable solution to ethno-nationalist violence. 45 Rather than delegitimizing their usage, Nazi and Allied transfers seemed to convince some that 'eliminating minorities was simply a necessary part of modern nationalism and modern internationalism alike'. 46 Although compulsory transfers have since attracted international legal sanction, lawyers employed by states seeking to gain acceptance of forced displacements work regularly to persuade their audiences that such endeavours accord with 'popular will'. Apart from the fact that the distinction between compulsory and voluntary movements is difficult to sustain in practice (it is almost perverse to speak of 'options' when a community is subject to pervasive and systematic persecution), the fact that the Greek-Turkish exchange-the chief precedent-was not nearly as effective at constraining ethno-nationalism as is generally believed should give us pause when evaluating such efforts.
If we are to understand the ongoing allure of population transfer, we must also understand its emergence in a region with unique customs and dynamics, not to mention grievances and aspirations. Regardless of where this or that group of interwar jurists may have stood on the question of legality, the feeling that violence (p.129) in Greece and Turkey called for measures distinct from the kind of minority protection that had become routine in Europe after 1919 but not as heavy-handed as a Mandate System-style regime was widely shared. We have grown accustomed in recent years to hearing that the states of south-east Europe and the Middle East have come to serve as a kind of 'laboratory' for state-building, humanitarian intervention, and international territorial administration. 47 Perhaps it should come as no surprise that one of the 
